Game Theory (Yale)

• 1. Introduction: five first lessons (Yale)
• 2. Putting yourselves into other people's shoes (Yale)
• 3. Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem (Yale)
• 4. Best responses in soccer and business partnerships (Yale)
• 5. Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs (Yale)
• 6. Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot (Yale)
• 7. Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line (Yale)
• 8. Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization (Yale)
• 9. Mixed strategies in theory and tennis (Yale)
• 11. Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium (Yale)
• 12. Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles (Yale)
• 13. Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions (Yale)
• 14. Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages (Yale)
• 15. Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats (Yale)
• 16. Backward induction: reputation and duels (Yale)
• 17. Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining (Yale)
• 18. Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection (Yale)
• 19. Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments (Yale)
• 20. Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition (Yale)
• 21. Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game (Yale)
• 22. Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing (Yale)
• 23. Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education (Yale)
• 24. Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse (Yale)